5 months ago
121 
Photo by Joris Verwijst/BSR Agency/Getty Images
The second part of our dive into Liverpool’s new coach brings an examination of Arne Slot’s approach to defensive structure and transition—and a few question marks.
Following on from part one of our deep dive into new Liverpool head coach Arne Slot that sought to examine his general footballing principles and approach to setting up an attack, we dig into how Slot sets up his teams in defence and transition—as well as taking a look at a few uncertainties and question marks posed by the 45-year-old Dutch trainer’s arrival on Merseyside.
Settled In Defence
Should the highly aggressive press Slot believes in—and which we looked at in the first part of our look at the tactics of Liverpool’s new manager—fail to do its job in swiftly winning possession back, or should game state call for it, Feyenoord can and will defend in a deep block, and will typically drop back into a compact 4-4-2 or 4-5-1 shape. The wingers provide solid cover for their fullbacks, denying free crosses—only Arsenal gave up fewer crosses into the box last season in Europe’s top seven leagues—and the midfielders diligently track deep runners to cover passing lanes, placing Feyenoord top of the list for denying successful passes into the penalty area.
On defensive set pieces, they are similarly solid, and only Arsenal and Sporting Lisbon gave up fewer shots from set pieces situations last season. In fact, no team in Europe gave up fewer shots total than Feyenoord did in the 2023/24 season. Much of this can of course be traced back to their dominance on the ball and insistence on tilting the field as far away from their own goal as possible—as is true to great extent for all modern top teams—but any potential defensive frailties are not down to Arne Slot’s coaching of settled defense.
One thing Feyenoord did not do well, however, was defend through passes, and despite dominating all of the above metrics, they were only 31st in the top seven leagues for defending through balls.
A Less Aggressive Transition
One of the major differences between Arne Slot’s Feyenoord and Jürgen Klopp’s recent Liverpool team is what they do when possession is recovered. Under Klopp, the Reds would ping it up the pitch looking for a quick counter and if they lost the ball it was often seen as just another opportunity to press again. Feyenoord by comparison have generally been far more precious about controlling the ball, and if an attacking counter isn’t on they’re happy to circulate and build anew rather than risking losing the ball through an overly aggressive attacking move.
Last season, despite generating essentially identical possession stats and progressive passing numbers, Feyenoord attempted 600 fewer long balls than Liverpool did. Slot’s team prefers working their way through the opposition with shorter passes, and while this increases the risk of potential turnovers taking place closer to their own goal, it also forces defending teams to face their attackers while retreating once the first line is broken.
The Question Marks
While the change in attacking structure led to Feyenoord putting up a more impressive statistical season this year than when they won the league—unfortunately for Slot, PSV broke the Eredivisie points record this season to win it—improving their expected goals by 42% and their expected goals conceded by 13%, his was a side that didn’t always look as fluid or impenetrable as the numbers suggested. For viewers it did feel at times as though superior individual quality often carried the Rotterdam club, whether through Mats Wieffer turning and waltzing past two pressers to break the lines or Yankuba Minteh successively annihilating a winger and a fullback to slide Santiago Giménez through on goal.
Similarly, Slot’s pressing system, which relies on players being able to complete two objectives at once—eg., pressing while covering a passing lane or covering a passing lane while threatening to jump a receiver—was statistically wildly effective over the length of the season but required extremely consistent decision making. Amongst the highs, there were certainly individual opponents that were able to circulate the ball back to the opposite flank after the initial phase of the press and create space to exploit.
Meanwhile in Europe, where the talent advantage they had over much of the Eredivisie was canceled out, Feyenoord struggled. They finished third in their group after losing twice to Atletico Madrid and once each to Lazio and Celtic. Atletico in particular had great success in both games by dropping Antoine Griezmann into a deeper area outside the centre-back, where he had space to turn and run at the defence.
In the Champions League Feyenoord’s opponents completed 57% more passes than their opponents in the Eredivisie, passes into the penalty area conceded increased by 56%, and expected goals against by 73%. Simply put, when robbed of a talent edge, Feyenoord were unable to deny their opponents success at anything like the same rate as in their domestic league, which appeared to be a result of those opponents having the ability to consistently exploit the fairly obviously identifiable gaps in the system.
Liverpool have the talent advantage over all but maybe five or six teams in the world at any given time, but—as with players making the same kind of a move to a higher level—there is undeniably a massive difference between the players Slot was coaching his team to face in the Eredivisie and the ones he will face in the Premier League.
Adjusting to a competition where there are 17 good teams instead of four, where every side has a pressing game and a low block and a transition game and a stable of stud athletes to make it all work, will likely make the margins a lot smaller. Given the questions raised by Feyenoord’s performances in Europe, Slot will have to prove he can learn—and learn fast—if he is to avoid getting shellshocked by the significant uptick in league-wide quality.
In Conclusion
It would be arrogant to suggest one can know exactly what Arne Slot’s first Liverpool team will look or play like. What does seem clear is that they will press high. That at least appears to be a non-negotiable aspect of his approach.
It also seems likely that in the broad strokes the central strikers, wide forwards, and centre-backs will be asked to perform in largely similar roles to what they have in the past under Klopp. When it comes to questions such as whether Trent Alexander-Arnold might invert like Geertruida at Feyenoord, be asked to make plays from wide areas like Hartman, or simply ends up fully converted into central midfield is anyone’s guess.
There are other questions, too. Double pivot or single six? Playing with one ten or two free eights? Overlaps? Underlaps? Barely any crossing at all or all of the crossing all the time?
When it comes to those questions, Arne Slot has shown an ability to successfully instil a number of systems into his athletes seemingly based on the attributes of the players on hand. It’s an immensely promising trait in a coach, and at Liverpool he will have a ridiculous amount of talent on hand to work with, and that means that the potential for something wonderful and unique is definitely present.
However, there are some question marks raised by Feyenoord’s European stumbles and it’s likely an unavoidable truth that Slot will have to learn on the job, and learn quickly, as he steps up massively from the Eredivisie to the Premier League and takes on one of the biggest and most demanding jobs in all of club football.
